<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE issues [
<!ELEMENT issues (issue*)>
<!ATTLIST issues burpVersion CDATA "">
<!ATTLIST issues exportTime CDATA "">
<!ELEMENT issue (serialNumber, type, name, host, path, location, severity, confidence, issueBackground?, remediationBackground?, issueDetail?, remediationDetail?, requestresponse*)>
<!ELEMENT serialNumber (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT type (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT name (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT host (#PCDATA)>
<!ATTLIST host ip CDATA "">
<!ELEMENT path (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT location (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT severity (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT confidence (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT issueBackground (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT remediationBackground (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT issueDetail (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT remediationDetail (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT requestresponse (request?, response?, responseRedirected?)>
<!ELEMENT request (#PCDATA)>
<!ATTLIST request base64 (true|false) "false">
<!ELEMENT response (#PCDATA)>
<!ATTLIST response base64 (true|false) "false">
<!ELEMENT responseRedirected (#PCDATA)>
]>
<issues burpVersion="1.5.18" exportTime="Thu Nov 07 15:19:06 GMT-03:00 2013">
  <issue>
    <serialNumber>382887018676354048</serialNumber>
    <type>3145984</type>
    <name>Cleartext submission of password</name>
    <host ip="200.20.20.201">http://www.example.org.ar</host>
    <path><![CDATA[/index.php]]></path>
    <location><![CDATA[/index.php]]></location>
    <severity>High</severity>
    <confidence>Certain</confidence>
    <issueBackground><![CDATA[Passwords submitted over an unencrypted connection are vulnerable to capture by an attacker who is suitably positioned on the network. This includes any malicious party located on the user's own network, within their ISP, within the ISP used by the application, and within the application's hosting infrastructure. Even if switched networks are employed at some of these locations, techniques exist to circumvent this defense and monitor the traffic passing through switches. ]]></issueBackground>
    <remediationBackground><![CDATA[The application should use transport-level encryption (SSL or TLS) to protect all sensitive communications passing between the client and the server. Communications that should be protected include the login mechanism and related functionality, and any functions where sensitive data can be accessed or privileged actions can be performed. These areas of the application should employ their own session handling mechanism, and the session tokens used should never be transmitted over unencrypted communications. If HTTP cookies are used for transmitting session tokens, then the secure flag should be set to prevent transmission over clear-text HTTP.]]></remediationBackground>
    <issueDetail><![CDATA[The page contains a form with the following action URL, which is submitted over clear-text HTTP:<ul><li>http://www.example.org.ar/login.php</li></ul>The form contains the following password field:<ul><li>pass</li></ul>]]></issueDetail>
    <requestresponse>
      <request base64="true"><![CDATA[R0VUIC9pbmRleC5waHAgSFRUUC8xLjENCkhvc3Q6IHd3dy5zYWx1ZGFjdGl2YS5vcmcuYXINCkFjY2VwdDogKi8qDQpBY2NlcHQtTGFuZ3VhZ2U6IGVuDQpVc2VyLUFnZW50OiBNb3ppbGxhLzUuMCAoY29tcGF0aWJsZTsgTVNJRSA5LjA7IFdpbmRvd3MgTlQgNi4xOyBXaW42NDsgeDY0OyBUcmlkZW50LzUuMCkNCkNvbm5lY3Rpb246IGNsb3NlDQoNCg==]]></request>
      <response base64="true"><![CDATA[[encoded data, 81284 characters]]]></response>
      <responseRedirected>false</responseRedirected>
    </requestresponse>
  </issue>
  <issue>
    <serialNumber>7694445463187357696</serialNumber>
    <type>3145984</type>
    <name>Cleartext submission of password</name>
    <host ip="200.20.20.201">http://www.example.org.ar</host>
    <path><![CDATA[/]]></path>
    <location><![CDATA[/]]></location>
    <severity>High</severity>
    <confidence>Certain</confidence>
    <issueBackground><![CDATA[Passwords submitted over an unencrypted connection are vulnerable to capture by an attacker who is suitably positioned on the network. This includes any malicious party located on the user's own network, within their ISP, within the ISP used by the application, and within the application's hosting infrastructure. Even if switched networks are employed at some of these locations, techniques exist to circumvent this defense and monitor the traffic passing through switches. ]]></issueBackground>
    <remediationBackground><![CDATA[The application should use transport-level encryption (SSL or TLS) to protect all sensitive communications passing between the client and the server. Communications that should be protected include the login mechanism and related functionality, and any functions where sensitive data can be accessed or privileged actions can be performed. These areas of the application should employ their own session handling mechanism, and the session tokens used should never be transmitted over unencrypted communications. If HTTP cookies are used for transmitting session tokens, then the secure flag should be set to prevent transmission over clear-text HTTP.]]></remediationBackground>
    <issueDetail><![CDATA[The page contains a form with the following action URL, which is submitted over clear-text HTTP:<ul><li>http://www.example.org.ar/login.php</li></ul>The form contains the following password field:<ul><li>pass</li></ul>]]></issueDetail>
    <requestresponse>
      <request base64="true"><![CDATA[R0VUIC8gSFRUUC8xLjENCkhvc3Q6IHd3dy5zYWx1ZGFjdGl2YS5vcmcuYXINClVzZXItQWdlbnQ6IE1vemlsbGEvNS4wIChNYWNpbnRvc2g7IEludGVsIE1hYyBPUyBYIDEwLjg7IHJ2OjIzLjApIEdlY2tvLzIwMTAwMTAxIEZpcmVmb3gvMjMuMA0KQWNjZXB0OiB0ZXh0L2h0bWwsYXBwbGljYXRpb24veGh0bWwreG1sLGFwcGxpY2F0aW9uL3htbDtxPTAuOSwqLyo7cT0wLjgNCkFjY2VwdC1MYW5ndWFnZTogZW4tVVMsZW47cT0wLjUNCkFjY2VwdC1FbmNvZGluZzogZ3ppcCwgZGVmbGF0ZQ0KQ29ubmVjdGlvbjoga2VlcC1hbGl2ZQ0KDQo=]]></request>
      <response base64="true"><![CDATA[[encoded data, 81420 characters]]]></response>
      <responseRedirected>false</responseRedirected>
    </requestresponse>
  </issue>
  <issue>
    <serialNumber>3831322476981454848</serialNumber>
    <type>5244928</type>
    <name>Password field with autocomplete enabled</name>
    <host ip="200.20.20.201">http://www.example.org.ar</host>
    <path><![CDATA[/]]></path>
    <location><![CDATA[/]]></location>
    <severity>Low</severity>
    <confidence>Certain</confidence>
    <issueBackground><![CDATA[Most browsers have a facility to remember user credentials that are entered into HTML forms. This function can be configured by the user and also by applications which employ user credentials. If the function is enabled, then credentials entered by the user are stored on their local computer and retrieved by the browser on future visits to the same application.<br><br>The stored credentials can be captured by an attacker who gains access to the computer, either locally or through some remote compromise. Further, methods have existed whereby a malicious web site can retrieve the stored credentials for other applications, by exploiting browser vulnerabilities or through application-level cross-domain attacks. ]]></issueBackground>
    <remediationBackground><![CDATA[To prevent browsers from storing credentials entered into HTML forms, you should include the attribute <b>autocomplete="off"</b> within the FORM tag (to protect all form fields) or within the relevant INPUT tags (to protect specific individual fields).]]></remediationBackground>
    <issueDetail><![CDATA[The page contains a form with the following action URL:<ul><li>http://www.example.org.ar/login.php</li></ul>The form contains the following password field with autocomplete enabled:<ul><li>pass</li></ul>]]></issueDetail>
    <requestresponse>
      <request base64="true"><![CDATA[R0VUIC8gSFRUUC8xLjENCkhvc3Q6IHd3dy5zYWx1ZGFjdGl2YS5vcmcuYXINClVzZXItQWdlbnQ6IE1vemlsbGEvNS4wIChNYWNpbnRvc2g7IEludGVsIE1hYyBPUyBYIDEwLjg7IHJ2OjIzLjApIEdlY2tvLzIwMTAwMTAxIEZpcmVmb3gvMjMuMA0KQWNjZXB0OiB0ZXh0L2h0bWwsYXBwbGljYXRpb24veGh0bWwreG1sLGFwcGxpY2F0aW9uL3htbDtxPTAuOSwqLyo7cT0wLjgNCkFjY2VwdC1MYW5ndWFnZTogZW4tVVMsZW47cT0wLjUNCkFjY2VwdC1FbmNvZGluZzogZ3ppcCwgZGVmbGF0ZQ0KQ29ubmVjdGlvbjoga2VlcC1hbGl2ZQ0KDQo=]]></request>
      <response base64="true"><![CDATA[[encoded data, 81420 characters]]]></response>
      <responseRedirected>false</responseRedirected>
    </requestresponse>
  </issue>
  <issue>
    <serialNumber>5107728146274449408</serialNumber>
    <type>5243904</type>
    <name>Cross-domain Referer leakage</name>
    <host ip="200.20.20.201">http://www.example.org.ar</host>
    <path><![CDATA[/index.php]]></path>
    <location><![CDATA[/index.php]]></location>
    <severity>Information</severity>
    <confidence>Certain</confidence>
    <issueBackground><![CDATA[When a web browser makes a request for a resource, it typically adds an HTTP header, called the "Referer" header, indicating the URL of the resource from which the request originated. This occurs in numerous situations, for example when a web page loads an image or script, or when a user clicks on a link or submits a form.<br><br>If the resource being requested resides on a different domain, then the Referer header is still generally included in the cross-domain request. If the originating URL contains any sensitive information within its query string, such as a session token, then this information will be transmitted to the other domain. If the other domain is not fully trusted by the application, then this may lead to a security compromise.<br><br>You should review the contents of the information being transmitted to other domains, and also determine whether those domains are fully trusted by the originating application.<br><br>Today's browsers may withhold the Referer header in some situations (for example, when loading a non-HTTPS resource from a page that was loaded over HTTPS, or when a Refresh directive is issued), but this behavior should not be relied upon to protect the originating URL from disclosure.<br><br>Note also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.]]></issueBackground>
    <remediationBackground><![CDATA[The application should never transmit any sensitive information within the URL query string. In addition to being leaked in the Referer header, such information may be logged in various locations and may be visible on-screen to untrusted parties.]]></remediationBackground>
    <issueDetail><![CDATA[The page was loaded from a URL containing a query string:<ul><li>http://www.example.org.ar/index.php?id=14_new&amp;nota=301</li></ul>The response contains the following links to other domains:<ul><li>http://download.macromedia.com/pub/shockwave/cabs/flash/swflash.cab</li><li>http://twitter.com/exampleONG</li><li>http://www.congresoviolencia.com/</li><li>http://www.facebook.com/home.php?</li><li>http://www.sitei.com.ar/</li></ul>]]></issueDetail>
    <requestresponse>
      <request base64="true"><![CDATA[R0VUIC9pbmRleC5waHA/aWQ9MTRfbmV3Jm5vdGE9MzAxIEhUVFAvMS4xDQpIb3N0OiB3d3cuc2FsdWRhY3RpdmEub3JnLmFyDQpBY2NlcHQ6ICovKg0KQWNjZXB0LUxhbmd1YWdlOiBlbg0KVXNlci1BZ2VudDogTW96aWxsYS81LjAgKGNvbXBhdGlibGU7IE1TSUUgOS4wOyBXaW5kb3dzIE5UIDYuMTsgV2luNjQ7IHg2NDsgVHJpZGVudC81LjApDQpDb25uZWN0aW9uOiBjbG9zZQ0KDQo=]]></request>
      <response base64="true"><![CDATA[[encoded data, 67560 characters]]]></response>
      <responseRedirected>false</responseRedirected>
    </requestresponse>
  </issue>
  <issue>
    <serialNumber>6589706705335705600</serialNumber>
    <type>5244928</type>
    <name>Password field with autocomplete enabled</name>
    <host ip="200.20.20.201">http://www.example.org.ar</host>
    <path><![CDATA[/index.php]]></path>
    <location><![CDATA[/index.php]]></location>
    <severity>Low</severity>
    <confidence>Certain</confidence>
    <issueBackground><![CDATA[Most browsers have a facility to remember user credentials that are entered into HTML forms. This function can be configured by the user and also by applications which employ user credentials. If the function is enabled, then credentials entered by the user are stored on their local computer and retrieved by the browser on future visits to the same application.<br><br>The stored credentials can be captured by an attacker who gains access to the computer, either locally or through some remote compromise. Further, methods have existed whereby a malicious web site can retrieve the stored credentials for other applications, by exploiting browser vulnerabilities or through application-level cross-domain attacks. ]]></issueBackground>
    <remediationBackground><![CDATA[To prevent browsers from storing credentials entered into HTML forms, you should include the attribute <b>autocomplete="off"</b> within the FORM tag (to protect all form fields) or within the relevant INPUT tags (to protect specific individual fields).]]></remediationBackground>
    <issueDetail><![CDATA[The page contains a form with the following action URL:<ul><li>http://www.example.org.ar/login.php</li></ul>The form contains the following password field with autocomplete enabled:<ul><li>pass</li></ul>]]></issueDetail>
    <requestresponse>
      <request base64="true"><![CDATA[R0VUIC9pbmRleC5waHAgSFRUUC8xLjENCkhvc3Q6IHd3dy5zYWx1ZGFjdGl2YS5vcmcuYXINCkFjY2VwdDogKi8qDQpBY2NlcHQtTGFuZ3VhZ2U6IGVuDQpVc2VyLUFnZW50OiBNb3ppbGxhLzUuMCAoY29tcGF0aWJsZTsgTVNJRSA5LjA7IFdpbmRvd3MgTlQgNi4xOyBXaW42NDsgeDY0OyBUcmlkZW50LzUuMCkNCkNvbm5lY3Rpb246IGNsb3NlDQoNCg==]]></request>
      <response base64="true"><![CDATA[[encoded data, 81284 characters]]]></response>
      <responseRedirected>false</responseRedirected>
    </requestresponse>
  </issue>
  <issue>
    <serialNumber>3685188967706670080</serialNumber>
    <type>5245440</type>
    <name>TRACE method is enabled</name>
    <host ip="200.20.20.201">http://www.example.org.ar</host>
    <path><![CDATA[/]]></path>
    <location><![CDATA[/]]></location>
    <severity>Information</severity>
    <confidence>Certain</confidence>
    <issueBackground><![CDATA[The TRACE method is designed for diagnostic purposes. If enabled, the web server will respond to requests which use the TRACE method by echoing in its response the exact request which was received.<br><br>Although this behavior is apparently harmless in itself, it can sometimes be leveraged to support attacks against other application users. If an attacker can find a way of causing a user to make a TRACE request, and can retrieve the response to that request, then the attacker will be able to capture any sensitive data which is included in the request by the user's browser, for example session cookies or credentials for platform-level authentication. This may exacerbate the impact of other vulnerabilities, such as cross-site scripting.]]></issueBackground>
    <remediationBackground><![CDATA[The TRACE method should be disabled on the web server.]]></remediationBackground>
    <requestresponse>
      <request base64="true"><![CDATA[VFJBQ0UgLyBIVFRQLzEuMA0KSG9zdDogd3d3LnNhbHVkYWN0aXZhLm9yZy5hcg0KQ29va2llOiBhYzMyNzQ2YjdhYzA2YzE5DQoNCg==]]></request>
      <response base64="true"><![CDATA[SFRUUC8xLjEgMjAwIE9LDQpEYXRlOiBUaHUsIDA3IE5vdiAyMDEzIDE3OjE0OjA2IEdNVA0KU2VydmVyOiBBcGFjaGUvMi4yLjIzIChVbml4KSBtb2Rfc3NsLzIuMi4yMyBPcGVuU1NMLzAuOS44ZS1maXBzLXJoZWw1DQpDb25uZWN0aW9uOiBjbG9zZQ0KQ29udGVudC1UeXBlOiBtZXNzYWdlL2h0dHANCg0KVFJBQ0UgLyBIVFRQLzEuMA0KSG9zdDogd3d3LnNhbHVkYWN0aXZhLm9yZy5hcg0KQ29va2llOiBhYzMyNzQ2YjdhYzA2YzE5OyBQSFBTRVNTSUQ9OTQ1ODVhYTBjMTFjZjJlODY0ZDgzZTI0Njc4Yjk4NjUNCg0K]]></response>
      <responseRedirected>false</responseRedirected>
    </requestresponse>
  </issue>
  <issue>
    <serialNumber>739390687228795904</serialNumber>
    <type>5245344</type>
    <name>Frameable response (potential Clickjacking)</name>
    <host ip="200.20.20.201">http://www.example.org.ar</host>
    <path><![CDATA[/]]></path>
    <location><![CDATA[/]]></location>
    <severity>Information</severity>
    <confidence>Firm</confidence>
    <issueBackground><![CDATA[It might be possible for a web page controlled by an attacker to load the content of this response within an iframe on the attacker's page. This may enable a "clickjacking" attack, in which the attacker's page overlays the target application's interface with a different interface provided by the attacker. By inducing victim users to perform actions such as mouse clicks and keystrokes, the attacker can cause them to unwittingly carry out actions within the application that is being targeted. This technique allows the attacker to circumvent defenses against cross-site request forgery, and may result in unauthorized actions.<br><br>Note that this issue is being reported because the application's response does not set a suitable <b>X-Frame-Options</b> header in order to prevent framing attacks. Some applications attempt to prevent these attacks from within the HTML page itself, using "framebusting" code. However, this type of defense is normally ineffective and can usually be circumvented by a skilled attacker.]]></issueBackground>
    <remediationBackground><![CDATA[You should review the application functions that are accessible from within the response, and determine whether they can be used by application users to perform any sensitive actions within the application. If so, then a framing attack targeting this response may result in unauthorized actions.<br><br>To effectively prevent framing attacks, the application should return a response header with the name <b>X-Frame-Options</b> and the value <b>DENY</b> to prevent framing altogether, or the value <b>SAMEORIGIN</b> to allow framing only by pages on the same origin as the response itself.]]></remediationBackground>
    <requestresponse>
      <request base64="true"><![CDATA[R0VUIC8gSFRUUC8xLjENCkhvc3Q6IHd3dy5zYWx1ZGFjdGl2YS5vcmcuYXINClVzZXItQWdlbnQ6IE1vemlsbGEvNS4wIChNYWNpbnRvc2g7IEludGVsIE1hYyBPUyBYIDEwLjg7IHJ2OjIzLjApIEdlY2tvLzIwMTAwMTAxIEZpcmVmb3gvMjMuMA0KQWNjZXB0OiB0ZXh0L2h0bWwsYXBwbGljYXRpb24veGh0bWwreG1sLGFwcGxpY2F0aW9uL3htbDtxPTAuOSwqLyo7cT0wLjgNCkFjY2VwdC1MYW5ndWFnZTogZW4tVVMsZW47cT0wLjUNCkFjY2VwdC1FbmNvZGluZzogZ3ppcCwgZGVmbGF0ZQ0KQ29ubmVjdGlvbjoga2VlcC1hbGl2ZQ0KDQo=]]></request>
      <response base64="true"><![CDATA[[encoded data, 81420 characters]]]></response>
      <responseRedirected>false</responseRedirected>
    </requestresponse>
  </issue>
  <issue>
    <serialNumber>3368157477358873600</serialNumber>
    <type>5245344</type>
    <name>Frameable response (potential Clickjacking)</name>
    <host ip="200.20.20.201">http://www.example.org.ar</host>
    <path><![CDATA[/index.php]]></path>
    <location><![CDATA[/index.php]]></location>
    <severity>Information</severity>
    <confidence>Firm</confidence>
    <issueBackground><![CDATA[It might be possible for a web page controlled by an attacker to load the content of this response within an iframe on the attacker's page. This may enable a "clickjacking" attack, in which the attacker's page overlays the target application's interface with a different interface provided by the attacker. By inducing victim users to perform actions such as mouse clicks and keystrokes, the attacker can cause them to unwittingly carry out actions within the application that is being targeted. This technique allows the attacker to circumvent defenses against cross-site request forgery, and may result in unauthorized actions.<br><br>Note that this issue is being reported because the application's response does not set a suitable <b>X-Frame-Options</b> header in order to prevent framing attacks. Some applications attempt to prevent these attacks from within the HTML page itself, using "framebusting" code. However, this type of defense is normally ineffective and can usually be circumvented by a skilled attacker.]]></issueBackground>
    <remediationBackground><![CDATA[You should review the application functions that are accessible from within the response, and determine whether they can be used by application users to perform any sensitive actions within the application. If so, then a framing attack targeting this response may result in unauthorized actions.<br><br>To effectively prevent framing attacks, the application should return a response header with the name <b>X-Frame-Options</b> and the value <b>DENY</b> to prevent framing altogether, or the value <b>SAMEORIGIN</b> to allow framing only by pages on the same origin as the response itself.]]></remediationBackground>
    <requestresponse>
      <request base64="true"><![CDATA[R0VUIC9pbmRleC5waHAgSFRUUC8xLjENCkhvc3Q6IHd3dy5zYWx1ZGFjdGl2YS5vcmcuYXINCkFjY2VwdDogKi8qDQpBY2NlcHQtTGFuZ3VhZ2U6IGVuDQpVc2VyLUFnZW50OiBNb3ppbGxhLzUuMCAoY29tcGF0aWJsZTsgTVNJRSA5LjA7IFdpbmRvd3MgTlQgNi4xOyBXaW42NDsgeDY0OyBUcmlkZW50LzUuMCkNCkNvbm5lY3Rpb246IGNsb3NlDQoNCg==]]></request>
      <response base64="true"><![CDATA[[encoded data, 81284 characters]]]></response>
      <responseRedirected>false</responseRedirected>
    </requestresponse>
  </issue>
  <issue>
    <serialNumber>8637745207739944960</serialNumber>
    <type>6291968</type>
    <name>Email addresses disclosed</name>
    <host ip="200.20.20.201">http://www.example.org.ar</host>
    <path><![CDATA[/index.php]]></path>
    <location><![CDATA[/index.php]]></location>
    <severity>Information</severity>
    <confidence>Certain</confidence>
    <issueBackground><![CDATA[The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.<br><br>However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organization's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.]]></issueBackground>
    <remediationBackground><![CDATA[You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).]]></remediationBackground>
    <issueDetail><![CDATA[The following email addresses were disclosed in the response:<ul><li>example@example.org.ar</li><li>example@saludactivo.org.ar</li></ul>]]></issueDetail>
    <requestresponse>
      <request base64="true"><![CDATA[R0VUIC9pbmRleC5waHAgSFRUUC8xLjENCkhvc3Q6IHd3dy5zYWx1ZGFjdGl2YS5vcmcuYXINCkFjY2VwdDogKi8qDQpBY2NlcHQtTGFuZ3VhZ2U6IGVuDQpVc2VyLUFnZW50OiBNb3ppbGxhLzUuMCAoY29tcGF0aWJsZTsgTVNJRSA5LjA7IFdpbmRvd3MgTlQgNi4xOyBXaW42NDsgeDY0OyBUcmlkZW50LzUuMCkNCkNvbm5lY3Rpb246IGNsb3NlDQoNCg==]]></request>
      <response base64="true"><![CDATA[[encoded data, 81284 characters]]]></response>
      <responseRedirected>false</responseRedirected>
    </requestresponse>
  </issue>
  <issue>
    <serialNumber>2348918843333562368</serialNumber>
    <type>6291968</type>
    <name>Email addresses disclosed</name>
    <host ip="200.20.20.201">http://www.example.org.ar</host>
    <path><![CDATA[/]]></path>
    <location><![CDATA[/]]></location>
    <severity>Information</severity>
    <confidence>Certain</confidence>
    <issueBackground><![CDATA[The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.<br><br>However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organization's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.]]></issueBackground>
    <remediationBackground><![CDATA[You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).]]></remediationBackground>
    <issueDetail><![CDATA[The following email addresses were disclosed in the response:<ul><li>example@example.org.ar</li><li>example@saludactivo.org.ar</li></ul>]]></issueDetail>
    <requestresponse>
      <request base64="true"><![CDATA[R0VUIC8gSFRUUC8xLjENCkhvc3Q6IHd3dy5zYWx1ZGFjdGl2YS5vcmcuYXINClVzZXItQWdlbnQ6IE1vemlsbGEvNS4wIChNYWNpbnRvc2g7IEludGVsIE1hYyBPUyBYIDEwLjg7IHJ2OjIzLjApIEdlY2tvLzIwMTAwMTAxIEZpcmVmb3gvMjMuMA0KQWNjZXB0OiB0ZXh0L2h0bWwsYXBwbGljYXRpb24veGh0bWwreG1sLGFwcGxpY2F0aW9uL3htbDtxPTAuOSwqLyo7cT0wLjgNCkFjY2VwdC1MYW5ndWFnZTogZW4tVVMsZW47cT0wLjUNCkFjY2VwdC1FbmNvZGluZzogZ3ppcCwgZGVmbGF0ZQ0KQ29ubmVjdGlvbjoga2VlcC1hbGl2ZQ0KDQo=]]></request>
      <response base64="true"><![CDATA[[encoded data, 81420 characters]]]></response>
      <responseRedirected>false</responseRedirected>
    </requestresponse>
  </issue>
  <issue>
    <serialNumber>3742539495863584768</serialNumber>
    <type>5243904</type>
    <name>Cross-domain Referer leakage</name>
    <host ip="200.20.20.201">http://www.example.org.ar</host>
    <path><![CDATA[/index.php]]></path>
    <location><![CDATA[/index.php]]></location>
    <severity>Information</severity>
    <confidence>Certain</confidence>
    <issueBackground><![CDATA[When a web browser makes a request for a resource, it typically adds an HTTP header, called the "Referer" header, indicating the URL of the resource from which the request originated. This occurs in numerous situations, for example when a web page loads an image or script, or when a user clicks on a link or submits a form.<br><br>If the resource being requested resides on a different domain, then the Referer header is still generally included in the cross-domain request. If the originating URL contains any sensitive information within its query string, such as a session token, then this information will be transmitted to the other domain. If the other domain is not fully trusted by the application, then this may lead to a security compromise.<br><br>You should review the contents of the information being transmitted to other domains, and also determine whether those domains are fully trusted by the originating application.<br><br>Today's browsers may withhold the Referer header in some situations (for example, when loading a non-HTTPS resource from a page that was loaded over HTTPS, or when a Refresh directive is issued), but this behavior should not be relied upon to protect the originating URL from disclosure.<br><br>Note also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.]]></issueBackground>
    <remediationBackground><![CDATA[The application should never transmit any sensitive information within the URL query string. In addition to being leaked in the Referer header, such information may be logged in various locations and may be visible on-screen to untrusted parties.]]></remediationBackground>
    <issueDetail><![CDATA[The page was loaded from a URL containing a query string:<ul><li>http://www.example.org.ar/index.php?id=18_new</li></ul>The response contains the following links to other domains:<ul><li>http://download.macromedia.com/pub/shockwave/cabs/flash/swflash.cab</li><li>http://twitter.com/exampleONG</li><li>http://www.congresoviolencia.com/index.php?id=inscripcion</li><li>http://www.congresoviolencia.com/index.php?id=modalidades</li><li>http://www.facebook.com/home.php?</li><li>http://www.sitei.com.ar/</li></ul>]]></issueDetail>
    <requestresponse>
      <request base64="true"><![CDATA[R0VUIC9pbmRleC5waHA/aWQ9MThfbmV3IEhUVFAvMS4xDQpIb3N0OiB3d3cuc2FsdWRhY3RpdmEub3JnLmFyDQpBY2NlcHQ6ICovKg0KQWNjZXB0LUxhbmd1YWdlOiBlbg0KVXNlci1BZ2VudDogTW96aWxsYS81LjAgKGNvbXBhdGlibGU7IE1TSUUgOS4wOyBXaW5kb3dzIE5UIDYuMTsgV2luNjQ7IHg2NDsgVHJpZGVudC81LjApDQpDb25uZWN0aW9uOiBjbG9zZQ0KDQo=]]></request>
      <response base64="true"><![CDATA[[encoded data, 81284 characters]]]></response>
      <responseRedirected>false</responseRedirected>
    </requestresponse>
  </issue>
  <issue>
    <serialNumber>3820606740865266688</serialNumber>
    <type>5245344</type>
    <name>Frameable response (potential Clickjacking)</name>
    <host ip="200.20.20.201">http://www.example.org.ar</host>
    <path><![CDATA[/donaciones/]]></path>
    <location><![CDATA[/donaciones/]]></location>
    <severity>Information</severity>
    <confidence>Firm</confidence>
    <issueBackground><![CDATA[It might be possible for a web page controlled by an attacker to load the content of this response within an iframe on the attacker's page. This may enable a "clickjacking" attack, in which the attacker's page overlays the target application's interface with a different interface provided by the attacker. By inducing victim users to perform actions such as mouse clicks and keystrokes, the attacker can cause them to unwittingly carry out actions within the application that is being targeted. This technique allows the attacker to circumvent defenses against cross-site request forgery, and may result in unauthorized actions.<br><br>Note that this issue is being reported because the application's response does not set a suitable <b>X-Frame-Options</b> header in order to prevent framing attacks. Some applications attempt to prevent these attacks from within the HTML page itself, using "framebusting" code. However, this type of defense is normally ineffective and can usually be circumvented by a skilled attacker.]]></issueBackground>
    <remediationBackground><![CDATA[You should review the application functions that are accessible from within the response, and determine whether they can be used by application users to perform any sensitive actions within the application. If so, then a framing attack targeting this response may result in unauthorized actions.<br><br>To effectively prevent framing attacks, the application should return a response header with the name <b>X-Frame-Options</b> and the value <b>DENY</b> to prevent framing altogether, or the value <b>SAMEORIGIN</b> to allow framing only by pages on the same origin as the response itself.]]></remediationBackground>
    <requestresponse>
      <request base64="true"><![CDATA[R0VUIC9kb25hY2lvbmVzLyBIVFRQLzEuMQ0KSG9zdDogd3d3LnNhbHVkYWN0aXZhLm9yZy5hcg0KQWNjZXB0OiAqLyoNCkFjY2VwdC1MYW5ndWFnZTogZW4NClVzZXItQWdlbnQ6IE1vemlsbGEvNS4wIChjb21wYXRpYmxlOyBNU0lFIDkuMDsgV2luZG93cyBOVCA2LjE7IFdpbjY0OyB4NjQ7IFRyaWRlbnQvNS4wKQ0KQ29ubmVjdGlvbjogY2xvc2UNCg0K]]></request>
      <response base64="true"><![CDATA[[encoded data, 39024 characters]]]></response>
      <responseRedirected>false</responseRedirected>
    </requestresponse>
  </issue>
  <issue>
    <serialNumber>3260534830746413056</serialNumber>
    <type>5244416</type>
    <name>Cookie without HttpOnly flag set</name>
    <host ip="200.20.20.201">http://www.example.org.ar</host>
    <path><![CDATA[/]]></path>
    <location><![CDATA[/]]></location>
    <severity>Low</severity>
    <confidence>Firm</confidence>
    <issueBackground><![CDATA[If the HttpOnly attribute is set on a cookie, then the cookie's value cannot be read or set by client-side JavaScript. This measure can prevent certain client-side attacks, such as cross-site scripting, from trivially capturing the cookie's value via an injected script.]]></issueBackground>
    <remediationBackground><![CDATA[There is usually no good reason not to set the HttpOnly flag on all cookies. Unless you specifically require legitimate client-side scripts within your application to read or set a cookie's value, you should set the HttpOnly flag by including this attribute within the relevant Set-cookie directive.<br><br>You should be aware that the restrictions imposed by the HttpOnly flag can potentially be circumvented in some circumstances, and that numerous other serious attacks can be delivered by client-side script injection, aside from simple cookie stealing.]]></remediationBackground>
    <issueDetail><![CDATA[The following cookie was issued by the application and does not have the HttpOnly flag set:<ul><li><b>PHPSESSID=94585aa0c11cf2e864d83e24678b9865; path=/</b></li></ul>The cookie appears to contain a session token, which may increase the risk associated with this issue. You should review the contents of the cookie to determine its function.]]></issueDetail>
    <requestresponse>
      <request base64="true"><![CDATA[R0VUIC8gSFRUUC8xLjENCkhvc3Q6IHd3dy5zYWx1ZGFjdGl2YS5vcmcuYXINClVzZXItQWdlbnQ6IE1vemlsbGEvNS4wIChNYWNpbnRvc2g7IEludGVsIE1hYyBPUyBYIDEwLjg7IHJ2OjIzLjApIEdlY2tvLzIwMTAwMTAxIEZpcmVmb3gvMjMuMA0KQWNjZXB0OiB0ZXh0L2h0bWwsYXBwbGljYXRpb24veGh0bWwreG1sLGFwcGxpY2F0aW9uL3htbDtxPTAuOSwqLyo7cT0wLjgNCkFjY2VwdC1MYW5ndWFnZTogZW4tVVMsZW47cT0wLjUNCkFjY2VwdC1FbmNvZGluZzogZ3ppcCwgZGVmbGF0ZQ0KQ29ubmVjdGlvbjoga2VlcC1hbGl2ZQ0KDQo=]]></request>
      <response base64="true"><![CDATA[[encoded data, 81420 characters]]]></response>
      <responseRedirected>false</responseRedirected>
    </requestresponse>
  </issue>
  <issue>
    <serialNumber>497905397226519552</serialNumber>
    <type>6291968</type>
    <name>Email addresses disclosed</name>
    <host ip="200.20.20.201">http://www.example.org.ar</host>
    <path><![CDATA[/donaciones/]]></path>
    <location><![CDATA[/donaciones/]]></location>
    <severity>Information</severity>
    <confidence>Certain</confidence>
    <issueBackground><![CDATA[The presence of email addresses within application responses does not necessarily constitute a security vulnerability. Email addresses may appear intentionally within contact information, and many applications (such as web mail) include arbitrary third-party email addresses within their core content.<br><br>However, email addresses of developers and other individuals (whether appearing on-screen or hidden within page source) may disclose information that is useful to an attacker; for example, they may represent usernames that can be used at the application's login, and they may be used in social engineering attacks against the organization's personnel. Unnecessary or excessive disclosure of email addresses may also lead to an increase in the volume of spam email received.]]></issueBackground>
    <remediationBackground><![CDATA[You should review the email addresses being disclosed by the application, and consider removing any that are unnecessary, or replacing personal addresses with anonymous mailbox addresses (such as helpdesk@example.com).]]></remediationBackground>
    <issueDetail><![CDATA[The following email address was disclosed in the response:<ul><li>example@example.org.ar</li></ul>]]></issueDetail>
    <requestresponse>
      <request base64="true"><![CDATA[R0VUIC9kb25hY2lvbmVzLyBIVFRQLzEuMQ0KSG9zdDogd3d3LnNhbHVkYWN0aXZhLm9yZy5hcg0KQWNjZXB0OiAqLyoNCkFjY2VwdC1MYW5ndWFnZTogZW4NClVzZXItQWdlbnQ6IE1vemlsbGEvNS4wIChjb21wYXRpYmxlOyBNU0lFIDkuMDsgV2luZG93cyBOVCA2LjE7IFdpbjY0OyB4NjQ7IFRyaWRlbnQvNS4wKQ0KQ29ubmVjdGlvbjogY2xvc2UNCg0K]]></request>
      <response base64="true"><![CDATA[[encoded data, 39024 characters]]]></response>
      <responseRedirected>false</responseRedirected>
    </requestresponse>
  </issue>
</issues>
