
# SID	@(#) misc.txt 1.2 18/10/14 21:39:13

## miscellaneous observations and texts (som in German only)

    # Additional informations:
OCSP
    # cat some.crl | openssl crl -text -inform der -noout
    # OCSP response "3" (TLS 1.3) ==> certifcate gueltig
    # SPDY - SPDY Protocol : http://www.chromium.org/spdy/spdy-protocol
ALPN
    #        https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7301
    #        ExtensionType Values 16
    #        ProtocolNameList:
    #        Protocol:  HTTP/1.1
    #           Identification Sequence: http/1.1
    #        Protocol:  SPDY/1
    #           Identification Sequence: spdy/1
    #        Protocol:  SPDY/2
    #           Identification Sequence: spdy/2
    #        Protocol:  SPDY/3
    #           Identification Sequence: spdy/3
    #        Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) is available with
    #        Net::SSLeay 1.56+ and +openssl-1.0.2+.
    #        Check support with: 'IO::Socket::SSL->can_alpn()'.
    #        Note that some client implementations may encounter problems if
    #        both NPN and ALPN are +specified. Since ALPN is intended as a
    #        replacement for NPN, try providing ALPN protocols +then fall back
    #        to NPN if that fails.
HSTS
    #        Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=16070400; includeSubDomains
    #        Apache config:
    #             Header set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=16070400; includeSubDomains"
    # SNI apache: https://wiki.apache.org/httpd/NameBasedSSLVHostsWithSNI
    #        SSLStrictSNIVHostCheck, which controls whether to allow non SNI clients to access a name-based virtual host.
    #        when client provided the hostname using SNI, the new environment variable SSL_TLS_SNI
Resumption
    # TLS session resumption problem with session ticket
    #        see https://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/11/22/forwardsecret.html
    #        "Since the session ticket contains the state of the session, and
    #         thus keys that can decrypt the session, it too must be protected
    #         by ephemeral keys. But, in order for session resumption to be
    #         effective, the keys protecting the session ticket have to be kept
    #         around for a certain amount of time: the idea of session resumption
    #         is that you can resume the session in the future, and you can't
    #         do that if the server can't decrypt the ticket!
    #         So the ephemeral, session ticket keys have to be distributed to
    #         all the frontend machines, without being written to any kind of
    #         persistent storage, and frequently rotated."
    #        see also https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/06/27/botchingpfs.html
    #
HPKP

SRI - Subresource Integrity
    #        supported by: Chrome 45, Firefox 43, Opera 32
    #        Note that SRI is SSL/TLS-related but security-related

    # zu RFC 2412:
    #           alle *DH* sind im Prinzip PFS.
    #           wird manchmal zusaetzlich mit DHE bezeichnet, wobei E für ephemeral
    #           also flüchtige, vergängliche Schlüssel steht
    #           D.H. ECDHE_* und DHE_* an den Anfang der Cipherliste stellen, z.B.
    #                TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
    #                TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
    #                TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
    #                TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
    # zu RFC 4366
                   # AKID - authority key identifier
                   # Server name Indication (SNI): server_name
                   # Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation: max_fragment_length
                   # Client Certificate URLs: client_certificate_url
                   # Trusted CA Indication: trusted_ca_keys
                   # Truncated HMAC: truncated_hmac
                   # Certificate Status Request (i.e. OCSP stapling): status_request
                   # Error Alerts
    # zu RFC 6066
                   # PkiPath
                   # Truncated CA keys (value 3)
                   # Truncated HMAC (value 4)
                   # (Certificate) Status Request (value 5)
                   # OCSP stapling mechanism
    # zu RFC 6125
                   # Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service
                   # Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)
                   # Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)

CIPHER Output (cipherscan)
    # prio  ciphersuite                  protocols  pfs                 curves
    # 1     ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384  TLSv1.2    ECDH,P-521,521bits  secp521r1,secp384r1,prime256v1

CIPHER Output (sslscan)
    # Preferred TLSv1.2  256 bits  ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384   Curve P-521 DHE 521
    # Accepted  TLSv1.2  256 bits  ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA          Curve P-521 DHE 521

Certificate Output
    # Certificate: untrusted, 2048 bits, sha256WithRSAEncryption signature

